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THE ROLES OF LAWBOOKS 
Alfred F. Conard* 
The law is a bookish profession. It is not the only one to depend 
on books, but it displays a unique veneration for them. A clergyman 
or a literary critic might have his portrait painted with a book in his 
hand, but only a lawyer would-choose to be portrayed against a 
backdrop of a hundred volumes ·in well-matched bindings. When 
Langdell sought to dignify the study of law as a science, he declared 
that the lawyer's library is his laboratory. 
Langdell's dictum brings smiles to our lips today because Dean 
Pound diverted our attention from "law in books" to "law in ac-
tion." We want to know how the law works, and what it works upon 
in the areas of human behavior, beliefs, and desires. But since we 
lack firsthand means for discovering these facts, we still depend on 
books to inform ourselves about the interactions of legal rules with 
the human and social matrix in which they operate. The quality of 
the law at any time, therefore, is profoundly dependent on the quali-
ty of the books relating to law that have appeared in preceding years. 
The Michigan Law Review's annual review of books provides us 
with an informative sample of the recently published books that are 
available to inform the lawyer's mind. No doubt the sample is bi-
ased by the idiosyncracies of the editors' tastes and of the reviewers' 
receptivity. But these biases are more likely to enhance than to di-
minish the significance of the selection. 
I 
In order to bring my observations within practicable limits, I 
have focused my attention on only one of these annual volumes -
the fat collection of 1981, which reviewed sixty-three different 
volumes. For similar reasons, I have not read each of the sixty-three 
books reviewed, but have judged their contents and approaches 
largely from what their reviewers have said about them, with only 
occasional glances at the originals. To add seasoning, I have also 
looked at the thirteen volumes that have been awarded prizes or 
honorable mentions by the Coif selection committee in the triennial 
awards from 1964 to 1979. 
The most striking aspect of the selection of books reviewed was 
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that a majority were neither expositions of rules of law nor critiques 
of these rules. Nearly one fifth (twelve out of sixty-three by my 
count) were historical accounts of the events and institutions with 
which the law deals. Two of these were studies of criminal behavior 
in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century England. Five were histories 
of legal developments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with 
a surprising variety of subjects such as the pre-Civil War federal 
courts, the post-Civil War Freedmen's Bureau; the judicial role of 
the House of Lords, the activities of prosecutors, and the conduct of 
institutions of confinement, including both prisons and mental hos-
pitals. Another handful were histories of contemporary phenomena, 
from the International Red Cross to the Mafia, spanning the regula-
tion of nuclear power and blacks' struggle for equality. One of the 
Coif awards went to a distinguished book in this category - Daw-
son's Oracles of the Law. Although some of these accounts contain 
an imperfectly hidden agenda, they are refreshing in their presenta-
tion of events without dictating the conclusions about contemporary 
law that the reader ought to draw from them. 
A much larger group of nonlaw books analyzed legal processes 
from social science viewpoints. Nine were expressly psychological. 
Two works subjected eyewitness testimony to the teachings of exper-
imental psychology. Social psychology and mental disease claimed 
another half-dozen volumes, with special reference to the forensic 
uses and abuses of these sciences in determining fitness for trial, eli-
gibility for criminal penalties, and solution of family conflicts. Three 
economic studies examined problems of energy, bureaucracy, and 
public finance. 
Sociologists have so thoroughly naturalized themselves in the le-
gal forest that one has trouble deciding whether to classify many of 
their current works as "legal" or "sociological." The merger is signi-
fied by a flock of legal studies that employ techniques borrowed 
from the social sciences to produce facts rather than arguments. The 
most exotic of these were a pair of studies of the techniques of dis-
pute resolution in remote areas such as East Africa, the Middle East, 
and Latin America. Closely related to these was a study of the lin-
gering effects in colonies and former colonies of the legal systems 
introduced by colonizing powers. Less exotic studies produced re-
vealing observations on legal services for the poor and case selection 
in the Supreme Court. 
The ultimate intellectual challenge - determining the values 
that a legal system should subserve - was accepted by four works 
reviewed in the 1981 anthology. Two were boldly entitled A Theory 
of Criminal Justice; a third, provocatively disguised as Mountains 
Without Handrails, pondered the value of preserving the most beau-
tiful works of nature; a fourth disdained all restrictions of subject 
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matter by speculating on A Theory of the Good and the Right. In two 
decades of Coif awards, two works of this type were honored -
Rawls's A Theory of Justice and Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously. 
With less than half of the 1981 anthology left, we approach the 
works that deal primarily with specific rules of law. Three of these 
were historical, tracing the recent history of tort law and of contract 
law in the common-law system, and of political crime in Europe. 
They represent an approach that has led to some of the most distin-
guished legal writing of recent decaqes. Lawrence Friedman and 
Willard Hurst won Coif prizes with probes in this vein, and Hurst 
has authored at least half a dozen other works that could easily have 
won the same accolade. 
II 
Finally, I come down to that minority of books that seem to deal 
primarily with law in force in the United States. Laying aside seven 
casebooks on constitutional law, there were about a dozen volumes 
in this area. Not surprisingly, some of them clustered around centers 
of current controversy. Inequality inspired volumes on Race, Racism, 
and American Law, Apartheid in America, and Equality and the 
Rights of Women. School problems motivated Legislated Learning 
and Education by Choice. Judicial activism seems to have triggered 
The Judge and Judicial Review and the National Political Process. 
The vagaries of tort law stimulatedA Nation of Guinea Pigs and The 
Duty to Act. Only one, Macneil's New Social Contract, approached 
a quiet area of scholarly concern. 
What struck me most forcefully about the books was a difference 
in approaches. On the one hand, an author may attempt primarily 
to describe what the law is, including a prognosis of its tendencies 
and a disclosure of the author's preferences. On the other, the au-
thor may put his primary emphasis on what the law ought to be -
defending the existing law if it is right, and attacking it if it is wrong. 
In this group of a dozen books, only one (Macneil's) seemed to be an 
interpretive description of the law, while the others seemed more like 
briefs of argument for or against the existing law. 
This division was a little surprising, in view of the veneration that 
has traditionally been accorded to the "treatise" approach. This ap-
proach characterized at least three items on the Coif list - Currie's 
Essays on the Conflict of Laws, Gilmore's Security Interests in Per-
sonal Property, and Palmer's The Law of Restitution. These books 
are rich in personal evaluations, but the personal opinions are gener-
ally distinguishable from descriptions of the law, and are balanced 
by recognition of opposing viewpoints. In contrast, nearly all of the 
books in the group under discussion devoted themselves almost en-
tirely to advocating particular rules. 
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I find it reassuring that legal writers are not only concerned with 
what the law ought to be, but are prepared to direct their writing 
explicitly toward advocating the better law. However, I was disap-
pointed by the predominant quality and content of the advocacy. In 
most cases, I did not feel enlightened by the arguments made - even 
where I sympathized with the conclusions - but rather turned off by 
the hammer blows of persuasion, which reminded me of TV 
commercials. 
There were at least two aspects of these works that made them 
unpersuasive. One was the brief-of-argument mode. In a brief, one 
mentions counterviews only to demolish them. One glides as un-
detectably as possible from the settled law to the position advocated, 
trying to make the position advocated seem like a mere application, 
or an inevitable corollary, of the settled law. When 
I sit as a moot-court judge, I have no objection to this type of persua-
sion because I can rely on the opposing brief to expose the non se-
quiturs. When I read an argumentative book, without an opposing 
brief at hand, I am forced to do my own rebutting. Before going 
further I want to see the contrary arguments; if the author does not 
supply them, I stop reading. The brief-of-argument approach is par-
ticularly frustrating when, as in Lawrence Tribe's Constitutional 
Law, a book that calls itself a "treatise" slips silently from truths 
perceived by judges to truths perceived by the author. 
This aspect of the books reviewed reminded me of a thesis ad-
vanced early in the present century by a British writer named Baty 
under the title, Polarized Law. Baty urged that legal literature would 
be more interesting if writers would choose an objective to which 
their analysis would be subordinate. If one turns to the writing of 
Baty's time, with its exaggerated reference to judicial wisdom, one 
can sympathize with his viewpoint. (It is an unfortunate coincidence 
that Baty's best known polemic was directed against vicarious liabil-
ity - a principle that has only increased its breadth and depth in the 
decades since he attacked it.) 
A second source of disappointment was the infrequency with 
which the teachings of history, psychology, economics, sociology, or 
philosophy were brought to bear on the choice of legal rules. The 
wealth of social scientists' observations about law - suggested by 
the broad selection of books from these areas reviewed in the 1981 
collection - seems to have had but slight influence on most lawyers' 
thinking about what laws should be. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to find links between social facts and 
legal decisions, but it has been done. In the collection under present 
consideration, Wolgast•~ Equality and the Rights of Women is a good 
example of argument from history, physiology, and culture. Among 
the Coif awards, Packer's Limits of the Criminal Sanction and Eisen-
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berg's Structure of the Corporation are illustrative. But this approach 
seems to be rare. 
I take comfort in the impression - unsubstantiated by quantita-
tive data - that less polarized and more scientific writing will be 
found more frequently in law reviews. Law reviews are often hostile 
to disguised briefs of argument; book publishers, on the other hand, 
may be partial to books that are contentious enough to win attention. 
Perhaps lawyers would be better served by a review of law reviews 
than by a review of books. 
III 
These reflections frame the dilemma facing a legal writer. He 
fills no need if he merely summarizes statutes and cases; digests, 
loose-leaf services, Lexis, and West/aw have taken over that job. Oc-
casionally the need arises for a synthesis of theory in a new or under-
developed area. Ken Davis's work on Administrative Law and 
George Palmer's on The Law of Restitution have filled needs of this 
kind. But in most areas the analytic and taxonomic task has been 
performed long since by writers like Story, Williston, Scott, and 
Prosser. 
Consequently, the polarized writers are quite right in deciding 
that they should be advocates. They should not be reproached 
merely because they advance positions that readers cannot accept. 
As Christopher Morley has said, "[t]he real purpose of books is to 
trap the mind into doing its own thinking." 
The writer's dilemma is to take a position sufficiently challenging 
to excite the reader's mind, but not so dogmatic as to stun and anes-
thetize it. Perceptions of social facts are the prime mind-openers. 
Differences in how we feel about affirmative action, exclusion of evi-
dence, or products liability are likely to depend on how we perceive 
the prevalent behavior of white employers and black employees, 
how we perceive the predominant activities of police and of the peo-
ple whom police arrest, and how we perceive the practices of phar-
maceutical manufacturers and Food and Drug Administration 
officials concerning new drugs. Advocates will do more to excite the 
minds of readers if they disclose and discuss the supposed social 
facts that underlie their preferences than if they assume a polar ob-
jective without revealing how they found it. 
Fortunately, social scientists' and philosophers' explorations of 
the world of law are producing more and more grist for legal mills. 
Although the linkages are not made as often as we would wish, they 
are appearing. They tend to appear earlier in law reviews than in 
books. But eventually they gain the authority conveyed by a hard 
cover, and a card in the library catalogue. As they do, we can be 
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assured that they will not go unremarked in the Michigan Law Re-
view's annual review of books. 
